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Articles
An Introduction to Interpretation of Express Contractual
Indemnity Provisions In Construction Contracts Under
California and Nevada Law
Richard D. Brown* and Mara E. Fortin*
I. INTRODUCTION
This law review article will provide a basic framework for preparing,
evaluating and analyzing the legal parameters of express contractual indemnity
provisions. Research and analysis have been conducted for the purpose of
summarizing indemnity provisions in general terms, as well as to position the
provisions within the context of the real legal world to assess real outcomes.
Indemnity issues ordinarily arise in the construction litigation context,
wherein a plaintiff is either injured related to an on-site accident or where there
are damages arising out of allegations of defective construction. Responsibility
for the potential exposure is the subject of this discussion, considering that many
different parties perform work on any given project and are, invariably, all named
in a lawsuit.
The owner, developer, general contractor and subcontractors are normally
joined into the litigation either as defendants or as third-party defendants. As
with most commercial building projects, the parties are related by way of a
number of written contracts. Many of the contracts contain express indemnity
provisions and insurance provisions. Specific analysis of the express contractual
indemnity language is required in each case. Finding legal precedent in the
appropriate jurisdictions interpreting the specific express contractual indemnity
language, is often helpful.
* Richard D. Brown is a member of the Nevada law firm of Wieczorek & Associates, LLP, which is a
member of Morris, Polich & Purdy, LLP, a Los Angeles, California based law firm. Mr. Brown concentrates his
practice in civil trial practice, including construction accidents, construction defect, product liability, premises
liability and negligence.
** Mara E. Fortin is also a member of the Nevada firm of Wieczorek & Associates, LLP, which is a
member of Morris, Polich & Purdy, LLP. Ms. Fortin is 1999 graduate of the James e. Rogers College of Law at
the University of Arizona. While in law school, Ms. Fortin served as the Editor in Chief of the Arizona Journal
of International and Comparative Law. Ms. Fortin concentrates her practice in all aspects of civil litigation,
including catastrophic personal injury, toxic tort, business and construction. She also practices in the area of
bankruptcy.
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II. DEFINING EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY
Parties to contracts are free to contract for terms of express contractual
indemnity under California law and Nevada law. In so contracting, parties may
seek to solidify their intentions with respect to indemnification and to avoid
application of principles of implied indemnity in the event of a loss arising out of
their relationship.
The principle of indemnity has been defined repeatedly in California case
authorities. For example, in Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., the
California Supreme Court defined indemnity as, "an obligation resting on one
party to make good a loss or damage another party has incurred."'
The parties to construction contracts are certainly free to negotiate and enter
into express contractual indemnity provisions limited only by specific statutes
which have codified California public policy and, to a more limited extent,
Nevada public policy.2 A limitation unique in the construction contract context is
one which prevents a party seeking indemnity (the indemnitee) to contractually
obligate the party providing indemnity (the indemnitor) to liability for the "sole
negligence" of the indemnitee. Simply stated, this prevents the indemnitee from
seeking to obtain and/or enforce an indemnity clause which requires the
indemnitor to provide indemnity for losses that are the result of the sole
negligence of the indemnitee.
The Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 17.225 provides that "where two or
more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution
among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of
them."3 The same statute also states that no tortfeasor is compelled to contribute
beyond his or her own equitable share of the entire liability.4 However, NRS
17.265 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in NRS 17.245, the provisions
of NRS 17.225 to 17.305, inclusive, do not impair any right of indemnity under
existing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right
of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution. 5 Hence, Nevada
law allows for indemnity, but is elusive as to the meaning of the phrase "impair
any right under existing law."
1. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon Inc., 532 P.2d 97, 100, 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628, 199 Cal. Rptr. 119,
452 (1975).
2. See generally, Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.225-17.305 (2000), inclusive, which codifies Nevada law regarding
rights to contribution and indemnity.
3. id. 17.225(1) (1999).
4. Id. 17.225(2).
5. Id. 17.265 (2000).
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III. INTERPRETING EXPRESS INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
Generally, express indemnity provisions are subject to the same rules
governing contract interpretation. Hence, courts will first look to the "plain
language" of a contractual indemnity provision in seeking to ascertain the
parties' intent. Obviously, review of the express contractual indemnity language
is subject to the statutory limitations discussed above and any other public policy
concerns raised by the language in question.
For example, in Nevada, additional applicable statutory sections of concern
include NRS 40.6406 and NRS 41.141.7 The existing case law in California,
6. Id. 40. 640 (1999) states:
In a claim to recover damages resulting from a constructional defect, a contractor is liable for his
acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of his agents, employees or subcontractors and is not liable
for any damages caused by:
1. The acts or omissions of a person other than the contractor or his agent, employee or
subcontractor;
2. The failure of a person other than the contractor or his agent, employee or subcontractor to
take reasonable action to reduce the damages or maintain the residence;
3. Normal wear, tear or deterioration;
4. Normal shrinkage, swelling, expansion or settlement; or
5. Any constructional defect disclosed to an owner before his purchase of the residence, if the
disclosure was provided in language that is understandable and was written in underlined
and boldfaced type with capital letters.
7. Id. 41.141 (1999) states:
I. In any action to recover damages for death or injury to persons or for injury to property in
which comparative negligence is asserted as a defense, the comparative negligence of the
plaintiff or his decedent does not bar a recovery if that negligence was not greater than the
negligence or gross negligence of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought.
2. In those cases, the judge shall instruct the jury that:
(a) The plaintiff may not recover if his comparative negligence or that of his decedent is
greater than the negligence of the defendant or the combined negligence of multiple
defendants.
(b) If the jury determines the plaintiff is entitled to recover, it shall return:
(1) By general verdict the total amount of damages the plaintiff would be entitled to
recover without regard to his comparative negligence; and
(2) A special verdict indicating the percentage of negligence attributable to each
party remaining in the action.
3. If a defendant in such an action settles with the plaintiff before the entry of judgment, the
comparative negligence of that defendant and the amount of the settlement must not
thereafter be admitted into evidence nor considered by the jury. The judge shall deduct
the amount of the settlement from the net sum otherwise recoverable by the plaintiff
pursuant to the general and special verdicts.
4. Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant in such an action, except as
otherwise provided in subsection 5, each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only
for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence
attributable to him.
5. This section does not affect the joint and several liability, if any, of the defendants in an
action based upon:
(a) Strict liability;
(b) An intentional tort;
(c) The emission, disposal or spillage of a toxic or hazardous substance;
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Nevada and the Ninth Circuit generally seem to extricate express contractual
indemnity provisions from statutory sections such as the above, but an argument
can always be made to the effect that these statutory provisions effectuate the
public policy of the state and, thus, any contractual provision contrary to that
stated statutory language is contrary to public policy. The Nevada Supreme
Court, when dealing with express indemnity issues arising in an insurance
context, stated that although statute may prevent the enforcement of express
indemnity provisions, as a matter of public policy, we conclude "as a matter of
public policy, we conclude the indemnity contracts in these cases should be
enforced because they allocate risk."8 The Nevada Supreme Court's position,
however, should be analyzed against an earlier decision that stated "[liiberty of
contract is not a universal right and may be abridged when required for the public
good." 9
One of the primary areas of interpretative concern surrounds which risks the
parties have agreed are covered by the indemnity provisions. In this context, the
intention of the parties is controlling. Again, in Rossmoor, the California
Supreme Court stated: "Where, as here, the parties have expressly contracted
with respect to the duty to indemnify, the extent of that duty must be determined
from the contract and not reliance on the independent doctrine of equitable
indemnity."' Further, the Court stated:
[W]e hold that.., the question whether an indemnity agreement covers a
given case turns primarily on contractual interpretation, and it is the
intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement that should control.
When the parties knowingly bargain for the protection at issue, the
protection should be afforded."
The California Supreme Court indicated, therefore, that interpretation of
express contractual indemnity provisions will be employed on a case-by-case
basis, governed by the unique circumstances of the damage or injury sought to be
indemnified in the language of the contract is at issue.'2
Another important interpretative area also concerns an analysis of whether or
not the parties' contract contains an obligation for the indemnitor (the party
(d) The concerted acts of the defendants; or
(e) An injury to any person or property resulting from a product which is manufactured,
distributed, sold or used in this state.
6. As used in this section:
(a) "Concerted acts of the defendants" does not include negligent acts committed by
providers of health care while working together to provide treatment to a patient.
(b) "Provider of health care" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 629.031.
8. American Fed. Savings Bank v. County of Washoe, 802 P.2d 1270, 1275, 106 Nev. 869, 876 (1990).
9. Lawson v. Halifax-Tonopah Mining Co., 35 P.2d 606, 611, 36 Nev. 591, 592 (1913).
10. Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 100, 13 Cal. 3d at 628, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
11. Id. at 104, 13 Cal. 3d at 633, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
12. Id. at 104, 13 Cal. 3d at 633, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
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supplying indemnity) to indemnify the indemnitee (the party receiving
indemnity) for the indemnitee's negligence. Arising from this question, one
frequently cited California appellate decision is MacDonald & Karuse, Inc. v.
San Jose Steel Co.13 This case is responsible for categorizing express contractual
indemnity agreements into three types. Prior to a discussion of the three -types of
indemnity agreements outlined in the MacDonald case, it should be noted that,
pursuant to subsequent California case authority, categorization of indemnity
agreements into the three categories should not be strictly applied since courts
have ruled that the intent of the parties entering into express contractual
indemnity agreements controls. The State of Nevada also follows this format.
Notwithstanding the above reservation, the MacDonald case is famous for its
designation of express contractual indemnity agreements into Type I, Type II and
Type III. The three categories of express indemnity agreements are explored
below.
A. Type I
From the perspective of the indemnitor, a Type I express contractual
indemnity agreement is the least favorable. Under a Type I agreement, the
indemnitor will indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own negligence,
whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or jointly negligent with the
indemnitor. Subject to the limitations required by the California Civil Code and
the Nevada Revised Statutes with respect to the "sole negligence" of the
indemnitee in a construction contract context, this type of indemnity agreement
clearly calls for the broadest indemnity coverage for the indemnitee. In a Type I
indemnity agreement, the indemnitor could be obligated to indemnify the
indemnitee even where the indemnitor did not engage in any measure of
negligence. Moreover, the courts do not concern themselves with the character of
the negligence engaged in by the indemnitee for which the indemnitee ultimately
seeks indemnification. In addition, the active versus passive distinction
applicable to Type II agreements, explained infra, is not a concern.
B. Type H
The Type II indemnity agreement is more favorable to the indemnitor. These
agreements are also commonly referred to by the courts as "general indemnity"
agreements. Under a Type II agreement, the indemnitor must indemnify the
indemnitee for liability arising from the indemnitor's negligence and from the
indemnitee's concurrent passive negligence. A Type II indemnity agreement does
not require the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's
active negligence.
13. 105 Cal. Rptr. 725, 29 Cal. App. 3d 413 (1972).
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Type II indemnity agreements frequently involve extensive analysis and
argument concerning the nature of the negligence ultimately alleged against the
indemnitee and, generally, significant litigation results concerning whether or not
the express indemnity provisions agreed to by the parties require indemnification
of the negligence of the indemnitee.
The distinction between active and passive negligence can, in general terms,
be broken down as follows:
An indemnitee who participates in some manner in the conduct or failure
to act that is determined the cause of injury and which is beyond the
mere failure to perform imposed by law is actively negligent and
therefore not entitled to indemnity under a Type II indemnity agreement.
By contrast, an indemnitee who is saddled with a measure of liability for
the failure to perform the duty of care imposed by law, for which there is
no participation with another in any affirmative active negligence that is
determined the proximate cause of injury to a third person, may be
determined to be passively negligent and subject to indemnification
under a Type II agreement.
The distinction between active and passive negligence is a complex one,
involving numerous court opinions. It could easily comprise a separate and
distinct law review article. 4
C. Type III
A Type III indemnity clause should be distinguished from a Type II or
"general indemnity" clause in that the parties to the agreement have expressly
announced their intention that the indemnitor will not indemnify the indemnitee
for any negligence which is attributable to the acts or omissions of the
indemnitee, regardless of whether said acts or omissions constitute active or
passive negligence. As discussed in detail in case law, in order for the courts to
construe an indemnity clause as that of Type III, the language should explicitly
express the parties' intention that the indemnitor will not indemnify the
indemnitee for any negligence of the indemnitee. There are exceptions to this
rule, such as where the contract clause is ambiguous or unclear.
Language similar to, "but only to the extent caused in whole or in part by
negligent acts or omissions of [the indemnitor]," indicates that a Type III
indemnity provision exists. Obviously, legal research to locate other cases which
contain language similar or identical to the language contained in the indemnity
provision at issue is often helpful as well.
14. Examples of the distinction between active and passive negligence in Nevada are Black & Decker v.
Essex Group, 775 P.2d 698, 105 Nev. 344 (1989) (setting case precedent), and Medallion Development, Inc. v.
Converse Consultants, 9330 P.2d 115, 113 Nev. 27 (1997).
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IV. CLASSIFICATION OF INDEMNITY PROVISIONS: PRACTICAL MATTERS
The development of computer-assisted legal research over the past twenty
years has greatly enhanced the ability of attorneys to locate specific case
precedent with identical or near similar language. The attorney is thereby enabled
to provide comprehensive recommendations to the client or insurance carrier
charged with the responsibility for making decisions related to a contractual
indemnity provision during the course of litigation.
Obviously, a more proactive approach, which would assist the litigation
attorney, is a comprehensive transactional analysis of the contract agreement by
the transactional attorney prior to the execution of that agreement by the parties
involved. Unfortunately, the reality is that the subcontractor often signs an
indemnity provision in a construction contract with little or no thought, or
without legal representation, so that the trial attorney is later faced with
interpretation of these provisions during litigation.
Again, locating specific case precedent which mirrors the language of the
contract being interpreted is important. An initial reading of the contract
language may cause the legal mind analyzing the provision to first conclude that
the provision is a Type I indemnity provision. However, as one becomes more
familiar with these types of provisions it becomes clear that provisions which
initially appear to be Type I, are often not. An example of such a contractual
indemnity provision is:
To the fullest extent permitted by law, the subcontractor shall indemnify
and hold harmless the Owner, Contractor, Architect, Architect's
consultants, and agents and employees or any of them from and against
claims, damages, losses and expenses, including, but not limited to,
attorneys' fees arising out of or resulting from performance of the
subcontractor's work under this subcontract, provided that such claim,
damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease
or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property including the
work itself and including loss of use resulting therefrom, but only to the
extent caused in whole or in part by negligent acts and/or omissions of
the subcontractor, subcontractor's sub-subcontractors, anyone directly
or indirectly employed by them or by anyone for whose acts they may be
liable regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense
is caused in part by a party identified hereunder. Such obligation shall
not be construed to negate, abridge, or otherwise reduce other rights or
obligations of indemnity which would otherwise exist to a party or
person described in this paragraph.5
15. This language is seen in many contracts between general contractors and subcontractors; and
practitioners are faced with the challeznge of interpreting its language.
1025
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Initial review of this sample contract provision could result in the incorrect
conclusion that the subcontractor has agreed to indemnify the general contractor
and others for any negligent act if the negligent act is caused in part by the
subcontractor, or, in the context of our analysis, the contract contains a Type I
indemnity agreement. However, a careful review of the case law and familiarity
with these types of indemnity provisions results in a contrary conclusion.
The indemnity is limited to indemnity for acts proximately caused only by
the negligent acts or omissions of the subcontractor. In other words, this contract
provision should be interpreted as a Type III indemnity agreement. Under this
agreement, the subcontractor has expressly indicated the intention not to provide
indemnity to the general contractor or the developer or others for any negligence
of other entities or persons. In effect, the subcontractor has limited indemnity to
its own acts, the acts of its employees, its subcontractors or anyone it controls or
for whom the subcontractor is responsible.
The courts, in interpreting these contract provisions, have stated their
intention to strictly construe indemnity provisions against the party responsible
for the drafting of the agreement. This is particularly true where the party seeking
indemnity is attempting to obtain indemnification for its own negligent acts,
based upon an express Type I indemnity clause.
In the now-famous Nevada case Calloway v. City of Reno, 6 the supreme
court stated:
Indemnity clauses are strictly construed, particularly when the
indemnitee claims that it should be indemnified against its own
negligence. Ambiguous indemnity contracts are construed against the
indemnitee, particularly when the indemnitee was the drafter of the
agreement. In fact, when an indemnitee seeks indemnity for its own
negligent acts based on an express indemnity clause, the indemnity
clause must clearly and unequivocally express the indemnitor's
assumption of liability for the negligent acts of the indemnitee.'7
The question that then arises is: How will a court, saddled with the task of
interpreting the intentions of the parties, interpret the language used in the
context? An example of this interpretation is contained in the case precedent of
Continental Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mechanical Services, Inc. 8 The court
concluded that an agreement which provided for the subcontractor to indemnify a
general contractor for a loss "which arises out of or is in any way connected"
with the subcontractor's "acts or omissions" did not require a showing that the
subcontractor was at fault in causing the general contractor's loss or that its
16. 939 P.2d 1020, 113 Nev. 564 (1997).
17. Id. at 1028, 113 Nev. at 577.
18. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668, 53 Cal. App. 4th 500 (1997).
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performance was a "substantial" or "predominating" cause of the loss.' 9 The court
also indicated that the mutual intention of the parties will control and, unless
given some special meaning by the parties, the words of a contract are to be
understood in their "ordinary and popular sense."2°
The attorney, client, claims unit manager or claims specialist analyzing an
express indemnity provision obviously hopes to find a case which contains the
express contractual language at issue, wherein the language stated has been used
in other contracts by other contracting parties and interpreted by courts in a
favorable way for them.
An example in the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York is Fiske v. Church of St. Mary of the Angels,2 which resulted in an
opinion by the trial court confirming the validity of the language of
indemnification employed in the contract, referenced above, as an expression of
the parties' intention that the indemnitor not be responsible to indemnify the
indemnitee for the indemnitee's negligence.
Jerome Fiske was an employee of Fiske II, a Pennsylvania corporation
involved in repairing and replacing the roof of the St. Mary's Church in Olean,
New York. Prior to the accident, St. Mary's contracted with the general
contractor, Whitford, for rehabilitation of St. Mary's Church. Whitford and St.
Mary's Church entered into a contract containing indemnification provisions
between St. Mary's Church and Whitford. Under the contract with St. Mary's,
Whitford was given the responsibility for hiring subcontractors to complete the
necessary repair. As such, in October of 1988, Fiske II was hired as a
subcontractor by Whitford. The contract between Fiske II and Whitford contains
the following indemnification language:
To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall indemnify
and hold harmless the Owner, Contractor, Architect, Architect's
consultants, and agents and employees of any of them from and against
claims, damages, losses and expenses, including but not limited to
attorneys' fees, arising out of or resulting from performance of the
Subcontractor's Work under this Subcontract, provided that such claim,
damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease
or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the
Work itself) including loss of use resulting therefrom, but only to the
extent caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of the
Subcontractor, the Subcontractor's Sub-subcontractors, anyone directly
or indirectly employed by them or by anyone for whose acts they may be
liable regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is
caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder. Such obligation shall
19. Id. at 668, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 500.
20. Id. at 670, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 504.
21. 802 F. Supp. 872 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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not be construed to negate, abridge, or otherwise reduce other rights or
obligations of indemnity which would otherwise exist as to a party or
person described in this Paragraph.22
The Fiske court analyzed the above indemnification language in the context
of a motion for summary judgment, filed by the general contractor, Whitford,
against Fiske II, pursuant to the indemnification language. Whitford's argument
was essentially that the injured plaintiff, Jerome Fiske, was at the time of the
accident under the direct supervision and control of Fiske II and that Fiske II had
primary and ultimate responsibility for his safety. Therefore, Whitford argued
that Fiske II was responsible for any negligence resulting in the accident and the
ultimate injury sustained by the plaintiff and, thus, Fiske should fully indemnify
Whitford pursuant to the terms of the express indemnity clause. Also at issue,
was the contention of Fiske II, in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, that one or more material issues of fact remained concerning whether
or not Whitford was negligent in any regard and, therefore, could not benefit
from the provisions of the express contractual indemnity agreement with Fiske II.
The trial court ruled:
After reviewing the evidence presented in the record, including affidavits
and deposition testimony, the court concludes that material issues of fact
remain as to whether the accident resulted from any negligence on the
part of Whitford. If negligence on the part of Whitford can be
established, Whitford will be at least partially responsible for any
damages awarded to plaintiff as the contractual indemnification clause
specifically states that indemnification would only be given to Whitford
for damages resulting from the negligence of Fiske II or its
subcontractors .23
In so holding, although unique to the procedural circumstances presented to the
court at that time, the Fiske court specifically determined that the express
contractual indemnity language at issue prevented Whitford (the indemnitee)
from seeking indemnity by Fiske II (the indemnitor) for Whitford's negligence, if
any negligence were to be found. Although the court refused to grant summary
judgment on the basis that one or more material factual issues remained to be
determined with respect to any negligence on the part of Whitford, it is clear
from the ruling of the court that the contractual indemnity provisions did not
require Whitford to indemnify Fiske II for Whitford's negligence, regardless of
whether the negligence was deemed active or passive.
In California, this would be deemed a Type III indemnity provision under the
old California system, which is no longer expressly utilized and, pursuant to
22. Fiske, 802 F. Supp. at 883-84 (emphasis omitted).
23. Id.
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subsequent case authority, courts should not strictly apply categorization. In
Nevada, it would be deemed an indemnity provision which provides the same
ultimate outcome without use of the classification system expressed in previous
cases.
The precedent of Regional Steely considered indemnity language similar to
that discussed above. After a lengthy introduction of interpretation of express
indemnity provisions, the Court stated that because the parties expressly
contracted to limit their liability, joint tortfeasor liability was precluded and the
Court granted summary judgment to Regional Steel Corporation. 5
V. CONCLUSION
Certainly there is much variance in both statutory and case law precedent
concerning the force and effect of contractual express indemnity clauses. A
provision may be voided based upon statutory authority precluding such a
provision. However, if there is no statute precluding such a provision, then the
intent of the parties in contracting becomes a subject of debate. If given
justifiable reason, the courts will enforce these problematic provisions. Certainly,
a trial practitioner is loath to inform his or her client that it will be indemnifying a
developer and/or general contractor for defects or injuries it had no part in
creating. Thus, the need to clearly and articulately draft the provisions in the first
instance, before litigation commences, is paramount. The effective transactional
attorney should be ever mindful of the need to protect the client's interests and
draft provisions that are equitable to all and which will later survive judicial
scrutiny. The litigation attorney should be aware of the various and competing
issues surrounding interpretation of these clauses.
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25. Id. at 419, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 529.

